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Abstract
The need to ensure a uniform interpretation and effective application of the large corpus of EU
environmental regulation in the jurisdictions of the Member States remains a task of pivotal importance
for the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). A quick look at the CURIA database reveals that many
judgments are handed down every year to clarify the meaning of EU environmental provisions. It is
therefore important to study the proper functioning of the tandem composed of the CJEU and the
national courts in this field of EU law. In that sense, this article responds to Bogojevic´’s call ‘to draw a
grander map of judicial dialogues initiated across various Member States’. More specifically, the topic
investigated by this article is how the United Kingdom (UK) courts have followed up on responses
received from the CJEU to their preliminary reference requests in the field of EU environmental law,
from the UK’s accession in 1972 until January 2017. All the cases we have retrieved from the UK show
various degrees of willingness to cooperate with the CJEU. This article highlights the existence of three
trends: full cooperation, fragmented cooperation and presumed cooperation.
Keywords
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1 Introduction
Officially starting in 1973,1 European Union (EU) environmental policy and law today constitutes a large
regulatory corpus. Hundreds of legally binding acts cover the vast majority of environmental aspects, with
soil law and judicial protection in environmental matters probably representing the two fields in which EU
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environmental law is at its scarcest.2 The need to ensure a uniform interpretation and effective application of
this large regulatory corpus across the jurisdiction of the Member States thus remains a task of pivotal
importance for the CJEU.
In essence, CJEU is not a court of appeal empowered to annul or modify national judgments.3 The
effective application of EU environmental law is the task of the Member States, as well as their courts. The
CJEU’s function is to serve as the ultimate interpretative authority on questions of EU law,4 including when
it engages in judicial dialogue with the national courts. Judicial dialogue is thus an essential feature of the
EU legal system, given this particular character of its jurisdiction,5 a jurisdiction in which the CJEU and
the national courts are, to use the words of Advocate General Jacobs, ‘bridged together exclusively by the
preliminary reference’.6 It is up to the CJEU and the national courts together, as a shared responsibility,7 to
rule on matters of EU law.8 In the process of ruling on EU law under the preliminary reference procedure,
the CJEU has fleshed out most EU legal principles, forming what Mancini considers the ‘Constitution of
Europe’.9 In this regard, Jacobs emphasises that the preliminary reference is an, albeit unsatisfactory,
opportunity for individuals to enjoy the rights derived by them under EU law.10 Alongside the protection
of individual rights, the preliminary reference procedure also plays a key role in guaranteeing that EU law is
uniformly applied across the Member States.11 A quick look at the CURIA database and the Service Section
of this journal shows that many judgments clarifying the meaning of EU environmental provisions are
handed down every year.
It is, therefore, important to study the proper functioning of the tandem composed of the CJEU and the
national courts in this field of EU law. Several studies have considered the advantages and shortcomings of
the preliminary reference mechanism in this regard, both in general12 or specifically to environmental
2. On soil, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for the protection of soil
and amending Directive 2004/35/EC, COM(2006) 232 final. On environmental justice, Proposal for a Directive of the European
Parliament and of the Council on access to justice in environmental matters, COM(2003) 624 final. Both withdrawn in 2014: see
[2014] OJ C 153/3.
3. R. Allan, ‘The European Court of Justice in Context: Forms and Patterns of Judicial Dialogue’ (2007) 1(2) European Journal of
Legal Studies 125; see also R.J.G.M.Widdershoven ‘Judicial Protection’ in J. Jans and S. Prechal (eds), Europeanisation of Public
Law 2nd edn (Amsterdam: Europa Law Publishing 2015) 358, for an analysis of the binding character of CJEU preliminary
rulings.
4. C.O. Lenz and G. Grill, ‘The Preliminary Ruling Procedure and the United Kingdom’ [1995] 19(3) Fordham International Law
Journal 847; E. Paunio, ‘Conflict, Power, and Understanding – Judicial Dialogue between the ECJ and National Courts’ [2010]
4(7) Journal of Extreme Legal Positivism 11; Case 6/64 Flaminio Costa v ENEL ECLI: EU: C:1964:66; Consolidated version of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ 326/47 Articles 19 TEU, 267 TFEU.
5. Case Opinion 2/13, ECLI: EU: C:2014:2454, para. 176.
6. F. Jacobs, ‘Judicial Dialogue and the Cross-Fertilization of Legal Systems: The European Court of Justice’ [2003] 38(3) Texas
International Law Journal 548.
7. Inaugural lecture of Professor Jurian Langer: J. Langer, ‘The Preliminary Ruling Procedure: Old Problems or New Challenges?’
(2016) Inaugural Lecture at the University of Groningen 3/2015. Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract¼2885256, last accessed
11 May 2017.
8. See Jacobs, above n. 6.
9. F. Mancini, ‘The Making of a Constitution of Europe’ [1989] 26(4) Common Market Law Review 595.
10. A.G. Jacobs, Opinion delivered on 21 March 2002, UPA, paras 40–44.
11. Case 166/73 Rheinmu¨hlen Du¨sseldorf v Einfuhr ECLI: EU: C:1974:3, para. 2.
12. See, for the general aspects of the procedure: L. Hoinuf and S. Voigt, ‘Analyzing Preliminary References as the Powerbase of the
European Court of Justice’ (2015) 39 European Journal of Law and Economics, 287; M. Broberg and N. Fenger, Preliminary
References to the European Court of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); C. Timmermans, ‘The European Union’s
Judicial System’ [2004] 41(2) Common Market Law Review 393-405; T. Tridimas, ‘Knocking on Heavens Door: Fragmentation,
Efficiency and Defiance in the Preliminary Ruling System’ [2003] 40(1)CommonMarket Law Review 9–50. See Langer, above n. 7.
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matters,13 and whether questions are asked and answered (the upload phase) correctly. Far less attention has
been paid to what occurs after the CJEU has responded to the national judges (the download phase).14 The
research question to be addressed in the download phase thus concerns the manner in which national courts
administer the replies received from the CJEU following a preliminary reference in the field of environ-
mental protection. This question has two aspects. First, it concerns the manner in which the referring
national court reacts to the CJEU’s answer. Second, it concerns the manner in which other national courts
react to the CJEU’s answer in the light of the unwritten stare decisis system confirmed by the ‘acte eclaire’
doctrine declared in Da Costa15 and CILFIT.16, 17 This article addresses only the first aspect, leaving the
latter for a follow-up study.
So far, only Bogojevic´ has addressed how national courts react to the CJEU’s answers to their referred
questions, and then only for the Swedish courts.18 As further discussed in section 2.3, she mapped the
Swedish courts’ behaviour and unfolded four different categories of judicial dialogue: interchanged dia-
logue, gapped dialogue, interrupted dialogue and silenced dialogue.19 This mapping exercise was only a
starting point. She argues for greater attention to be paid to this particular aspect of judicial dialogue, given
that national court behaviours have, so far, not been mapped. Empirical data on this matter are fundamental
to place theoretical discussions on judicial dialogue in perspective.
As Bogojevic´’s findings are only a starting point, this article takes up the call to ‘to draw a grander map of
judicial dialogues initiated across various Member States’.20 Following up on Part I of Bogojevic´’s map,
this article presents Part II. More specifically, the topic investigated by this article is how the United
Kingdom (UK) courts follow up on the CJEU’s answers to their preliminary references in the field of
EU environmental law, from the UK’s accession in 1972 until January 2017. Mapping the UK courts’
behaviour is important because it is claimed that the Community’s status quo lacks justification in the eyes
of the English courts, which, in turn, affects how they go about interpreting statutes.21 UK law and courts are
traditionally considered sceptical of environmental legislation and European integration. This aversion to
gold-plating/green-plating means that most EU environmental law is implemented in UK law in almost
13. V. Heyvaert, J. Thornton, and R. Drabble, ‘With Reference to the Environment: the Preliminary Reference Procedure, Envi-
ronmental Decisions and the Domestic Judiciary’ (2014) 130 Law Quarterly Review 413.
14. M. Bobek ‘EU Law in National Courts: Viking, Laval, and Beyond’ in M. R. Freedland and J. Prassl (eds) Viking, Laval and
Beyond (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014) 326. S. Bogojevic´ ‘Judicial Dialogue Unpacked: Twenty Years of Preliminary Refer-
ences on Environmental Matters Initiated by the Swedish Judiciary’(2017) 29(2) Journal of Environmental Law 263–283.
15. Joined Cases 28 to 30/62 Da Costa en Schaake [1963] ECR 31
16. Case C-283/81 Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health [1982] ECR 3415, ECLI: EU: C:1982:335
(CILFIT).
17. See also H. Rasmussen, ‘The European Court’s Acte Clair strategy in C.I.L.F.I.T’ (1984) 9 European Law Review 242; A. Arnull,
‘The Use and Abuse of Article 177 EEC’ (1989) 52 The Modern Law Review 604; F. Mancini and D. Keeling, ‘From CILFIT to
ERT: The Constitutional Challenge Facing the European Court’ (1991) 1 Yearbook of European Law 4; P. Allott, ‘Preliminary
Rulings: Another Infant Disease?’ (2000) 25 European Law Review 538; see Tridimas, above n. 12; P. Wattel, ‘Ko¨bler, CILFIT
and Welthgrove: We Can’t Go On Meeting Like This’ (2004) 41 Common Market Law Review 177; N. Fenger and M. Broberg,
‘Finding Light in the Darkness: On the Actual Application of the act e´claire´ Doctrine’ (2011) 3 Yearbook of European Law 180;
and V. J. Thornton and R. Drabble, ‘With Reference to the Environment: The Preliminary Reference Procedure, Environmental
Decisions and the Domestic Judiciary’ (2014) 130 Law Quarterly Review 413.
18. See Bogojevic´, above n. 14.
19. Ibid. at 2.
20. Ibid.
21. P. Craig ‘Report on the United Kingdom’ in J.H.H Weiler and others, The European Court and National Courts-Doctrine and
Jurisprudence (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998) 197.
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verbatim fashion both by the courts and in statute.22 The UK is therefore a good counterpart to complement
the findings fromBogojevic´’s study of Sweden, which is usually considered to be both pro-environment and
pro-Europe.
To properly present our empirical findings, it is important first to establish the common denominators of
the research. Section 2 accordingly provides an account of what is meant by ‘judicial dialogue’ and its micro
dimension ‘judicial cooperation’ (section 2.1), preliminary references in ‘environmental matters’ (section
2.2), the categories under which national courts responses to the CJEU’s answers can be classified (section
2.3), and the role played by the variables influencing judicial dialogue (section 2.4). Section 3 then provides
the empirical data, based on the mapping of UK courts’ practice in environmental matters, followed by a
synthesis in Section 4. Our main findings are three new categories of interplay. All the cases we retrieved
from the UK reveal a willingness to cooperate with the CJEU to various degrees. This section highlights the
existence of three trends. First, the national court applies the CJEU’s judgment to the letter (full cooper-
ation); second, the CJEU decides to reformulate the question and the national court applies the CJEU’s
answer inasmuch as it considers it relevant to the case (fragmented cooperation); third, the CJEU judgment
is not applied, because the losing party withdraws from the proceedings, predicting full compliance (pre-
sumed cooperation). These three new categories extend the map started by Bogojevic´ and therefore help
develop a better insight into national court behaviour in the download phase of Article 267 TFEU proce-
dures. Section 2 is also useful to steer comparative studies on this matter. Indeed, similar studies focusing on
the Netherlands, Germany, France and Italy are in the process of being finalised and will be the subject of
separate publications. Together, these empirical studies will flesh out a map of the judicial dialogue down-
load phase in EU environmental matters. Once the actual shape of judicial dialogue in EU environmental
matters is described, an in-depth comparative research project can be conducted to unveil the reasons for the
empirical findings presented in this paper and the coming ones described.
2 Setting the stage: Judicial dialogue and judicial cooperation in preliminary
references in environmental matters
2.1 The micro dimension of judicial dialogue: judicial cooperation
There are various kinds of judicial dialogue.23 Jacobs highlights the two main features of the internal
judicial dialogue in the EU legal system. The first is the ‘constitutional’ judicial dialogue (that is, the
jurisdiction of the CJEU to hear complaints lodged by other EU institutions or the Member States).24
Second, and the object of this contribution, there is a judicial dialogue through the preliminary reference
mechanism, or what Jacobs considers ‘[ . . . ] the most important feature of the judicial system of the
Community [ . . . ]’.25 However, we argue that it is only possible to speak of a dialogue between judges at
the macro level – the level at which a national judiciary is considered as a whole. At the micro level, when
considering the behaviour of individual courts, it is impossible to speak of a dialogue, simply because
asking a question and receiving an answer can hardly be considered a dialogue. To summarise the
22. L. Squintani,Gold-plating of European Environmental Law (PhD thesis, University of Groningen, 2013); H. Anker et al., ‘Coping
with EU Environmental Legislation: Transposition Principles and Practices’ (2015) 1 JEL 17; J. Jans, L. Squintani et al., ‘“Gold
Plating” of European Environmental Measures?’ (2009) 4 JEEPL 417 at 418. These contributions focus mostly on gold plating in
statutes, but also provide examples of gold plating in court.
23. See Rosas, above n. 3.
24. See Jacobs, above n. 6 at 548.
25. F. Jacobs and A. Durand, ‘References to the European Court: Practice and Procedure’ [1976] 35(1) The Cambridge Law Journal 3.
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procedure, lower courts have a right to ask a preliminary question,26 courts of last instance have an
obligation in this regard27 and the CJEU has a duty to answer these questions. The national court referring
the question must comply with the CJEU’s answer,28 but it does not have to report its final judgment to the
CJEU. A quick look at the CURIA and Eurlex databases shows that information about the continuation of
national proceedings is usually missing. The CJEU’s recommendations underline the desirability of a
practice where national referring courts would report back to the CJEU how they have ruled on the matters
subject to the preliminary question, in light of the principle of sincere cooperation.29 Yet, when questioned,
the CJEU only confirmed that the preliminary ruling is binding on the referring court without providing any
comment on why the majority of national cases could not be located.30 How the national courts respond to
the CJEU’s answers can thus hardly be considered as being directed at the CJEU, and therefore at best
amount to a dialogue of the deaf.31 Proposals have beenmade to improve the dialogue, ranging frommaking
a better use of Article 101 of the Rules of Procedure to inviting national referring judges to participate in the
hearing before the CJEU, but they are not actually applied.32
In light of the normative background of the preliminary question and answer and the lack of a real
discussion between the two main parties to the procedure, we will only speak of cooperative or uncoopera-
tive dialogue at macro level. Instead, at micro level we prefer to discuss in terms of sincere cooperation
rather than judicial dialogue. Indeed, the principle of sincere cooperation goes hand-in-hand with the
objective of the preliminary reference itself. First, because a judicial system which is built upon the division
of competences between the national courts and the CJEU calls for a greater cooperation.33 Second, since it
is through the correct application of preliminary references that the national courts are offered the oppor-
tunity to demonstrate a cooperative attitude towards the CJEU par excellence.34 In this regard, it could
debatably be argued that the willingness of the national courts to refer questions to the CJEU might also
indicate their willingness to give effect to its rulings.35 Yet rather than being based onmutual understanding,
judicial cooperation can be affected by elements of conflict and a struggle for power, as wisely remembered
26. TFEU, Art. 267(2).
27. Ibid. at Art. 267(3).
28. Case 29/68Milch, Fett und Eierkontor GmbH vHauptzollamt Saarbru¨cken ECLI: EU: C:1969:27, para. 3. See also H. Schermers,
Judicial Protection in the European Communities 2nd edn (Springer: New York, 1976), who at p. 392 shows that most national
courts seem to support this rule.
29. Recommendations to national courts and tribunals in relation to the initiation of preliminary ruling proceedings (2012/C338/01)
issued by the Court of Justice of the European Communities, OJ C 160, 28.5.2011 para. 35.
30. E-mail correspondence with the CJEU, through its Press and Information Unit, received on 9 March 2017. The question asked of
the CJEU was whether there is any general practice according to which the national courts have to report the outcome of the
national decision following a preliminary reference and whether the CJEU felt that this practice should be improved. The CJEU
chose not to address this issue, opting instead for a general answer which essentially only conveyed information on where to find
the Court of Justice’s decisions, namely http://www.curia.com.
31. Theories on dialogue define it as a process in which ‘there is no attempt to gain points or to make your particular view prevail.
Rather, whenever any mistake is discovered on the part of anybody, everybody gains. It’s a situation called win–win [ . . . ] in
which we are not playing a game against each other, but with each other. In a dialogue, everybody wins’. D. Bohm, On Dialogue
(Routledge: London: 1996) 7; see Bobek, above n. 14, at 262–283.
32. See Langer, above n. 7; see in Dutch http://njb.nl/blog/prejudiciele-samenwerking-en-dialoog.18560.lynkx. For a critical
response to the suggestions by Advocate General Wattel (in Dutch), see http://europeancourts.blogspot.nl/2016/05/prejudiciele-
procedure-iedereen-doet.html; see also R. Barents, Procedures en procesvoering voor het Hof van Justitie en het Gerecht van
eerste aanleg van de EG (The Netherlands: Kluwer, 2005), 334.
33. T. Tridimas, ‘Constitutional Review of Member State Action: The Virtues and Vices of an Incomplete Jurisdiction’ [2011] 9(3-4)
International Journal of Constitutional Law 738.
34. S. Prechal, ‘Communication within the Preliminary Rulings Procedure Responsibilities of the National Courts’ (2014) 21(4)
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 754.
35. See Schermers, above n. 28, at 392.
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by Paunio.36 Ascertaining where this comes from would require not only an inquiry into the perception of
EU law in the eyes of national courts,37 but also a sociological inquiry into aMember State’s approach to the
EU38, which is not the objective of this article.
2.2 Defining the common denominators: ‘environmental matters’
The concept of ‘preliminary references in environmental matters’ is a term in need of refinement. If it is
understood in its broadest sense, it would encompass each case under Article 267 TFEU dealing with
environmental issues. In turn, the concept of ‘environmental issues’ in its broadest sense would encompass
– alongside more traditional environmental matters39 – nuclear and other energy issues, animal health
issues, product standards when linked to environmental concerns, national justifications of EU law, espe-
cially in the context of the fundamental freedoms, etc. Such a broad approach, although suitable for
understanding the relationship between national courts and the CJEU, would not provide a clear picture
of whether the EU environmental law acquis is interpreted and applied uniformly. Moreover, a broad
approach to the concept of ‘EU environmental law’ would increase the chances of cases being added or
omitted improperly from the analysis. The narrowest approach to the concept of ‘preliminary references in
environmental matters’ would be to look at cases under Article 267 TFEU in which an interpretation of acts
based on current Article 192 TFEU was required. Such a narrow approach would ensure the highest degree
of consistency in the comparative approach. Yet it would exclude from the analysis cases which are usually
considered ‘environmental cases’, but which relate to an EU legal act which is not based on Article 192
TFEU for the simple reason that the centre of gravity test favoured the application of a different legal basis.
A compromise between the broadest and the narrowest approaches was achieved by searching Curia for
preliminary references from the UK concerning environment, energy and provisions governing the insti-
tutions. The results where then filtered for judgments which did not concern EU acts as defied in Article 288
TFEU, having as their primary or explicit secondary objective the protection of the environment.
2.3 Categories of judicial cooperation
The cases retrieved by means of the research criteria mentioned in section 2.2 can then be analysed to
identify the kind of judicial cooperation taking place. In this regard, all the cases can be categorised into two
main groups: cases supporting the existence of a cooperative dialogue, in which national courts can be
considered as following the CJEU’s answers and those supporting the existence of an uncooperative
dialogue, in which national courts cannot be considered to being following the CJEU’s answers. Unco-
operative dialogue arises when the two main positive obligations and three negative obligations binding the
national courts according to Verhoeven are not respected.40 The positive obligations are that the courts
should ensure the effective application of EU law and the protection of rights stemming from EU legisla-
tion; the negative obligations are that they should abstain from measures which impede the effectiveness of
EU law, the proper functioning of the internal market or the process of EU integration.
It is within the category of cases sustaining the existence of an uncooperative dialogue that Bogojevic´’s
categories can be located, albeit renamed in terms of interchanged cooperation, gapped cooperation,
36. See Paunio, above n. 4, at 6.
37. See Lenz and Grill, above n. 4, at 848.
38. See Craig, above n. 21.
39. Such as water, air, soil, industrial emissions, environmental damage, etc.
40. M. Verhoeven, The Costanzo Obligation (Intersentia: Oxford, 2011) 41.
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interrupted cooperation and silenced cooperation,41 for the reasons indicated in section 2.1. Interchanged
cooperation means that there is an interchange of values. The preliminary reference is absorbed into
national law and applied as though it were national case law.42 For example, in the Ga¨vle Kraftva¨rme the
CJEU’s had clarified what ‘incinerator’ meant under the Waste Incineration Directive.43 The Swedish
Supreme Court tasked a lower court to apply the criteria set out by the CJEU. In so doing, the lower court
only referred to the Swedish Supreme Court ruling not to the CJEU’s ruling.44 The lower national court did
not treat the preliminary reference as though the information were provided by the CJEU.45 Gapped
cooperation signifies that there is a lack of judicial dialogue between the CJEU and the national court.
There can be instances where a national court questions the validity of the CJEU’s ruling.46 For example, in
the Billerud case the national court, after receiving the CJEU’s ruling, considered whether the CJEU’s
interpretation of the ETS Directive complied with the European Convention of Human Rights.47 This was
done without making further reference to the CJEU. There is then interrupted cooperation, which means
that national law may have been revised, and/or facts added, rendering the preliminary reference useless
while the procedure remains ongoing.48 For example, in Jan Nilsson, the relevance of the CJEU’s answer to
the question of whether stuffed species fell under the CITES Regulation lost importance as the criminal
offence for trading in such species was abrogated, leading to the criminal charges against Mr Nilsson being
dropped.49 Finally, Bogojevic´ proposes a category of silenced cooperation, covering cases where the
national court does not mention the preliminary ruling and ignores it.50 For example, in Mickelsson and
Roos the national court ultimately cleared Mr Mickelsson and Mr Roos of the criminal charges on grounds
different from the ones considered in the CJEU’s ruling, which was not even mentioned.51 Although these
cases do not concern the interpretation of an EU directive aiming primarily or secondarily at environmental
protection, and would thus fall outside the scope of the research based on the criteria set out in section 2.2,
they still represent cases where a national court has not included the reasoning provided by the CJEU in its
national ruling. The CJEU’s ruling is thus ignored.
This article considers whether cases from another jurisdiction than Sweden, the UK, fit within Bogo-
jevic´’s categories, or whether new categories should be introduced. As elaborated in section 3, every case
we retrieved from the UK shows adherence to the CJEU’s rulings to various degrees. Therefore, not all of
them fall under the categories indicated by Bogojevic´. Three new categories of judicial cooperation are
introduced here, and are fully explained and accounted for in section 3. First, full cooperation, where the
national court applies the CJEU’s judgment to the letter; second, fragmented cooperation, where the CJEU
decides to reformulate the question and the national court applies the CJEU’s ruling inasmuch as it can be
applied the part of the answer that it considers relevant; and third, presumed cooperation, where the CJEU’s
judgment is not applied, because the party which is deemed to have lost before the CJEU withdraws from
the proceedings, expecting full the decision to be applied in full by the national judge.
41. See Bogojevic´, above n. 14.
42. Ibid.
43. Case C-251/07Ga¨vle Kraftva¨rme [2008] ECR I-07047; Directive 2000/76/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4
December 2000 on the incineration of waste [2000] OJ L332/91.
44. Bogojevic´, above n. 14, at 273.
45. Ibid.
46. Bogojevic´, above n. 14.
47. Case C-203/12 Billerud [2013] Electronic Report of Cases.
48. Bogojevic´, above n. 14.
49. Case 154/02 Jan Nilsson [2003] ECR I-12733 as reported above n. 14.
50. Bogojevic´, above n. 14.
51. Case C-142/05 Mickelsson & Roos [2009] ECR I-04273.
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2.4 The role of factors influencing judicial dialogue and judicial cooperation
It goes without saying that as in any important cooperation, good communication in judicial matters is
extremely important. This begins in the upload phase, where the national court must pose well-formulated
questions and provide additional information if necessary.52 Intervening parties, especially the Member
State from which the questions originate, should help to provide a clear picture of the subject matter of the
question, while refraining from changing its focus.53 From the CJEU’s perspective, it must be borne in mind
that answering in abstractions and general principles may, in fact, be the best way to provide national courts
with the rules needed for a broad application of the CJEU’s interpretation to the facts at hand; however, the
Court in Luxembourg must accept that by so doing, it is not controlling the outcome of concrete cases.54
Indeed, this approach could lead to the rulings provided by the CJEU being considered too theoretical by
national judges to resolve the case in question.55 Judges might then choose not to apply such rulings.56
As such, the CJEU is required to be more precise if it wishes to avoid complicating the delivery and
reception of a preliminary ruling because, as Prechal maintains, just like communication in other spheres of
life, something can always go wrong with judicial communication.57 To this end, the CJEU tries to help
preserve the interpretative uniformity of EU law by delivering guidance cases which present a set of
specific circumstances to be taken into account to interpret a certain provision.58 A step further in control-
ling the outcome of national cases would be for the CJEU to deliver outcome cases, in which the CJEU
would only state that a Member State, for instance, had failed to implement a directive correctly, thus
leaving to the national court only the outcome of striking down the decision taken in breach of EU law.59
The different working languages of the national and EU courts, in this case French and English, as well as
differing drafting practices, can also influence judicial dialogue and consequently how national courts
follow up CJEU’s rulings.60
All these variables are important to understanding why a national court behaves in a particular way, but
they are irrelevant as far as this study’s mapping exercise is concerned. Indeed, as in Bogojevic´’s study, the
question lying at the heart of this article is how national courts react to a CJEU ruling, notwhy they react in a
particular way. The variables indicated in this section are relevant for follow-up studies explaining the
meaning and relevance of the finding presented in this study. Such follow-up studies will also have to take
into account the meta-juridical aspects related to judicial cultures and national attitudes towards the EU
integration process. The comparative methodology needed to link the national experiences together requires
a rigid framework to avoid comparing ‘apples’ and ‘pears’, hence requiring the setting up a broad research
project with the help of external funding, such as the H2020-funding programme, to be applied. Accord-
ingly, while we will keep these variables in mind, we do not address the ‘why’ question in this study. We
will confine ourselves in sections 3 and 4 to indicating whether, based on the information at our disposal,
any or all of the variables mentioned in this section can be observed. This does not detract from the
relevance of this study because, as stated in the introduction, it is only possible to organise and conduct
52. Above n. 7.
53. We are grateful to Jurian Langer for pointing out to us the importance of the role of national agents in the context of preliminary
references procedures.
54. G. Davies, ‘Activism Relocated. The Self-restraint of the European Court of Justice in its National Context’ (2011) 19(1) Journal
of European Public Policy 83.
55. Bobek, above n. 14, at 332.
56. Ibid.
57. See Prechal, above n. 34.
58. See Tridimas, above n. 33.
59. Ibid. at 740.
60. Bobek, above n. 14.
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a research project on the reasons for our empirical findings once how the judicial dialogue in environmental
matters is actually shaped is known.
3 UK judges as European judges in the context of preliminary references in
environmental matters
Bogojevic´’s contributions have demonstrated the existence of four categories of cases in which national
courts do not sincerely cooperate with the CJEU. As shown in the following three sections, three new
categories, all demonstrating judicial cooperation, should be added to the judicial dialogue map, when we
look at the behaviour of UK courts in environmental matters.
UK scepticism of the EU integration process,61 its minimalistic approach to the implementation of EU
obligations62 and the reluctance of UK courts to ask preliminary references63 are well documented in
academic writing. The readers of this journal do not need two non-UK lawyers to tell them how judicial
review is organised in the UK or what the UK judicial culture is.64 As indicated in the previous section, to do
so is also not necessary to answer the research question posed by this contribution. For a recent overview of
the general and peculiar features of the judicial administrative review systems in England andWales from a
comparative perspective, we direct the reader to Backes and Eliantonio’s edited book on judicial review of
administrative acts.65 Given the space at our disposal, this section focuses directly on our empirical
findings.
A total of 30 preliminary references were made by UK courts in this field between 1972 and mid 2017.66
The eight preliminary references which form part of this study were requested at various stages in the
national proceedings, representing every instance. Five references were requested by the highest court67 and
the rest by lower courts,68 but none came from Scotland. Though including the national procedure for every
61. For a recent overview of the turbulent relationship between the UK and the EU, see L. Gormley, ‘Brexit – Nevermind the Whys
and Wherefores? Fog in the Channel, Continent Cut Off!’ (2017) 40(4) Fordham International Law Journal 1175-1206.
62. See Anker, et al., above n. 22.
63. See Heyvaert, Thornton, and Drabble, above n. 13.
64. Discussion of the work of the UK’s environmental judiciary can be obtained from the case law overviews provided in every issue
of this journal and in the various case notes published here, such as most recently those of P. Bishop, ‘Salmon Fishing in the
Severn: Judicial Deference to Regulatory Judgments based on Scientific Assessments’ (2017) 19(3) Environmental Law Review
201–209; K. Hood, ‘Access to Judicial Review and Widening the Definition of “Person Aggrieved”: Walton v The Scottish
Ministers (2014) 16(4) Environmental Law Review 277–286; and R. Kennedy, ‘Substantial Interest’ Requirement for Judicial
Review of Planning Decisions Harding v Cork County Council and An Bord Pleana´la and Xces Projects Ltd Now Known as
Kinsale Harbour Developments Ltd’ (2009) 11 Environmental Law Review 46–54.
65. C. Backes and M. Eliantonio (eds), Judicial Review of Administrative Action (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2018).
66. Cases retrieved from ‘http://curia.europa.eu/juris/recherche.jsf?language¼en’ using the search terms subject matter: ‘Environ-
ment’ ‘Energy’ ‘Provisions governing the institutions’ and procedure: ‘preliminary reference’. Search performed in August 2017.
67. Case 404/13 The Queen, on the Application of ClientEarth v The Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
ECLI: EU: C:2014:2382; Case 260/11 The Queen, on the Application of David Edwards and Lilian Pallikaropoulos v Envi-
ronment Agency and Others ECLI: EU: C:2013:221; Case 44/95 Regina v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex parte Royal
Society for the Protection of Birds ECLI: EU: C:1996:297; Case C-290/03 The Queen, on the application of Diane Barker v
London Borough of Bromley ECLI: EU: C:2006:286. Case C-213/89 Factortame Ltd and Others ECLI: EU: C:1990:257.
68. Case C-252/05 The Queen on the Application of: Thames Water Utilities Ltd v South East London Division, Bromley Magistrates’
Court ECLI: EU: C:2007:276; Case 75/08 The Queen, on the Application of Christopher Mellor v Secretary of State for Com-
munities and Local Government ECLI: EU: C:2009:279; Case 87/82 Lieutenant Commander A.G. Rogers v H.B.L. Darthenay
ECLI: EU: C:1983:131. Case C-591/15 The Gibraltar Betting and Gaming Association Limited v Commissioners for Her
Majesty’s Revenue and Customs andHerMajesty’s Treasury ECLI: EU: C:2017:449; Case C 272/15 Swiss International Air Lines
AG v The Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change and Environment Agency ECLI: EU: C:2016:993; C-547/14 Philip
Morris Brands SARL and Others v Secretary of State for Health ECLI: EU: C:2016:325; C-279/12 Fish Legal and Emily Shirley v
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case would most likely have helped us form a better understanding of this situation, reports for the
remaining 22 cases were impossible to locate.69 Two of the eight cases located did not result in a corre-
sponding national decision, because the party which lost before the CJEU decided to withdraw from the
proceedings (one of those was from Northern Ireland).70 Information as to the reasons for the lack of a
follow-up case was provided by the lawyer representing one of the parties for these two procedures. This
might have also been the case for the other 22 cases for which no-national follow-up could be retrieved,71
but out-of-court settlements or other reasons could also explain the impossibility of locating the remaining
follow-up cases.
All the cases we retrieved from the UK show the CJEU’s rulings being followed, to various degrees. This
section highlights the existence of three trends. First, the national court applies the CJEU’s judgment to the
letter (full cooperation), as discussed in section 3.1; second, the CJEU decides to reformulate the question
and the national court applies the resulting decision as far as it can be applied (fragmented cooperation), as
discussed in section 3.2; third, the CJEU judgment is not applied because the losing party withdraws from
the proceedings, implying full cooperation (presumed cooperation), as discussed in section 3.3.
3.1 First category: Full Cooperation
National courts, in light of the principle of sincere cooperation, must ensure that the judicial dialogue
between them and the CJEU runs smoothly by demonstrating cooperative conduct in applying the CJEU’s
guidance. As regards the latter aspect, such cooperative conduct was evident in five cases in the UK,72 with
the national judges deciding completely in accordance with the CJEU’s decision, although in one such case
this conclusion requires qualification.
Full cooperation was easy to establish in those cases where the Court of Justice delivered an outcome
case (that is, where it indicated whether a given interpretation of the EU act in question is right or wrong).
This was the case, for example, in R v Secretary of State for the environment (ex parte Society of Birds).73
The case concerned a decision of the Secretary of State excluding some 22 acres of land near Lappel Bank
from consideration as a Special Area of Conservation (SAC), in the grounds of economic interests. Uncer-
tain whether economic considerations could be taken into account when delineating SACs under the Wild
Information Commissioner and Others ECLI: EU: C:2013:853; C-412/10 Deo Antoine Homawoo v GMF Assurances SA ECLI:
EU: C:2011:747; Case C-366/10 Air Transport Association of America and Others v Secretary of State for Energy and Climate
Change ECLI: EU: C:2011:864; Case C-14/10Nickel Institute v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions ECLI: EU: C:2011:503;
Case C-210/03 The Queen, on the application of: Swedish Match AB and Swedish Match UK Ltd v Secretary of State for Health
ECLI: EU: C:2004:802; Case C-491/01 The Queen v Secretary of State for Health, ex parte British American Tobacco
(Investments) Ltd and Imperial Tobacco Ltd ECLI: EU: C:2002:741; Case C-466/00 Arben Kaba v Secretary of State for the Home
Department ECLI: EU: C:2003:127.
69. The relevant lawyers that were contacted to provide information on the missing national decisions did not reply in the vast majority
of the cases.
70. For Case 15/10 Etimine SA v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions ECLI: EU: C:2011:504, and Case 474/10Department of the
Environment for Northern Ireland v Seaport (NI) Ltd and Others ECLI: EU: C:2011:681 there is confirmation that the parties
withdrew.
71. Unfortunately, we could obtain no confirmation of this despite attempting to contact the respective lawyers, and also the High
Court of England Administrative Bench Division for more information on the missing cases.
72. R v London Borough of Bromley ex parte Barker [2006] UKHL 52; Thames Water Utility Ltd v Bromley Magistrates’ Court and
The Environment Agency [2008] EWHC 1763; R v Environment Agency and others [2013] UKSC 78; R (Mellor) v Secretary of
State for Communities and Local Government [2009] EWCA Civ 1201; R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex parte Royal
Society for the Protection of Birds [1997] Env LR 431
73. Royal Society for the Protection of Birds above n. 67.
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Birds Directive,74 the House of Lords asked the CJEU for its opinion. The House of Lords also asked
whether anything would change if the economic considerations constituted matters of superior general
interest or reasons of overriding public interest.
The CJEU answered both questions in the negative.75 It held that theMember States are not authorised to
include economic considerations in their decisions delineating SACs. Moreover, it held that even if these
considerations are of overriding public interest, they cannot be taken into account at the stage of delineating
a SAC, but only at a later stage.
In line with the CJEU’s interpretation, the House of Lords quashed the decisions handed down by the
Court of Appeal and the High Court and declared invalid the decision of the Secretary of State regarding the
delineation of a special protection area under the Wild Birds Directive, on the grounds that the Secretary of
State had taken economic requirements into consideration in reaching the decision in question. The House
of Lords also stated that within the context of delineating a special protection area, the Secretary of State
was not authorised to take economic requirements into consideration as imperative reasons, as indicated in
the Wild Birds Directive.76 In so doing, a full account was given of the CJEU’s ruling, meaning that this
cannot be described as silenced cooperation, as happened in Sweden in the Mickelsson and Roos case.77
A similar finding can be drawn from another outcome case, that of Diane Barker v Bromley Council.78
London&Regional Properties Ltd applied to Bromley Council for outline planning permission to develop a
leisure complex. Bromley Council concluded in 1998 that an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)
envisaged under the EIA Directive79 was not required, and granted outline planning permission subject to
some reserved matters for subsequent approval. When a decision was needed for approval of the reserved
matters, some Bromley councillors requested an EIA, but under English law it was no longer possible to
carry one out at that stage. Final approval was therefore granted in 1999 without an EIA. Ms Barker
challenged this decision, but her action was dismissed both in the first instance and on appeal. She then
appealed before the House of Lords. The House of Lords had doubts about whether the permission was a
‘development consent’ under the old EIA Directive and also whether the EIA could be carried out at a later
stage of the consent, if initially it was believed that it was not required. It therefore asked first, whether the
concept of development consent should be interpreted by considering national law exclusively. Second, it
asked whether the directive requires an EIA to be carried out if, following the grant of outline planning
permission subject to conditions that reserved matters be approved, and without an EIA having been carried
out, it emerges when approval of the reserved matters is sought that the project may have a significant effect
on the environment by virtue, inter alia, of its nature, size or location.
74. Back then, Council Directive 79/409/EEC of 2 April 1979 on the conservation of wild birds, [1979] OJ L 103/1. Today, Directive
2009/147/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2009 on the conservation of wild birds, [2010] OJ L
20/7.
75. Case C-44/95 Regina v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex parte: Royal Society for the Protection of Birds ECLI: EU:
C:1996:297, in particular paras 27, 31, and 42.
76. We could not retrieve the national judgment itself from Bailii, Westlaw, the website of the House of Lords or any other source.
Information about the follow up judgment were retrieved from Eurlex, ‘Document 81997UK0313(04)’ (Europaeu,13/03/1997).
Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/ALL/?uri¼CELEX:81997UK0313(04)&qid¼1502184875824.Last
accessed, 11 August 2017.
77. See section 2.3, above.
78. See Diane Barker, above n. 67.
79. Then, Council Directive 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the
environment [1985] OJ L 175/40. Today, Directive 2014/52/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014
amending Directive 2011/92/EU on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment [2014]
OJ L 124/1.
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The CJEU answered that the national court, when deciding if planning permission can be considered a
‘development consent’, cannot exclusively look at national considerations, but should apply national law in
a manner consistent with EU law. Second, the CJEU held that when national law provides for a consent
procedure of more than one stage in which the latter stage cannot extend beyond the parameters set by the
principal decision, the EIA should be performed at the time of the principal decision. However, if
the adverse effects cannot be identified at the initial stage, the EIA should be carried out in the context
of the implementing decision.80
In line with the CJEU’s interpretation, and presenting a full account of it, the House of Lords did not
consider national law exclusively when interpreting the concept of ‘development consent’. It stated that
proceedings granting outline planning permission subject to subsequent approval by the relevant authority
should be deemed a ‘consent procedure’ under the EIA Directive.81 Quashing the Court of Appeal decision,
the House of Lords held that by precluding an EIA at a later stage of the consent procedure, the Planning
Regulations 1998 had failed to transpose the directive correctly. Moreover, Bromley Council was wrong
when it concluded that an EIA was not possible at a later stage in the decision.
Remaining within the realm of the EIA Directive, the fourth case showing full cooperation is Mellor v
Secretary of State.82 The case is about a planning permission granted in an Area of Outstanding Natural
Beauty (AONB). Following the applicant’s appeal, the planning permission was quashed on grounds that
the council had not adopted an EIA opinion. At a later stage, the Secretary of State decided differently and
stated that it was not necessary for him to adduce additional reasons to his decision not to conduct an EIA,
based on an at-that-time relevant precedent in English case law. The England and Wales Court of Appeal
had its own doubts and decided to ask the CJEU if, under the EIA Directive, Member States are obliged to
communicate reasons for refusing to carry out an EIA, and if the motivation already expressed by the
Secretary of State formally satisfied any potential duty to provide reasons.
The CJEU held that public authorities are not required to provide reasons for a refusal to adopt an EIA.
However, authorities are obliged to provide the relevant reasons for their determination upon the request of
an interested party. Furthermore, the CJEU stated that the Secretary of State’s reasoning could be consid-
ered sufficient as long as it had taken into account the information provided by the parties, supplemented by
other information capable of allowing the parties to appeal that decision, something which was for the
national court to assess.83
By the time the CJEU’s decision reached the England and Wales Court of Appeal, various events had
occurred. First, two more screening directions had been provided, rendering the original screening direction
of the Secretary of State irrelevant. Second, the planning permission had been withdrawn. The England and
Wales Court of Appeal was thus, in theory, not obliged to follow the CJEU’s decision, since the ‘old
referring facts’ had been superseded by others. Cooperation between the national court and the CJEU could
have followed the pattern described as interrupted cooperation, as observed in Sweden in the context of the
Jan Nilsson case.84 This did not turn out to be the case. The England and Wales Court of Appeal applied
the CJEU’s ruling, and accordingly awarded costs. The England and Wales Court of Appeal went into the
details of the correspondence between the Mr Mellor and the State.85 It resisted the attempts of the
defending parties to focus only on the part of the CJEU’s ruling stating that there is no obligation to provide
80. Barker, above n. 67 at 47, 48 and 49.
81. Ibid. at para. 30.
82. See Mellor, above n. 68.
83. Ibid. at 65.
84. See section 2.4, above.
85. Court of Appeal (England &Wales), R (Mellor) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2009] EWCA Civ
1201, paras 11 ff.
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reasons in a decision not to conduct an EIA. The England and Wales Court of Appeal was clear that there is
an obligation to provide such information if such a request has been made. It also considered that MrMellor
had made such a request. Accordingly, it concluded that the state had failed to provide information at the
time of the request. That such information had ultimately been provided did not change the fact that Mr
Mellor had had to commence proceedings to challenge the initial refusal. Accordingly, the state was ordered
to pay the costs of the proceedings.
The CJEU also delivered an outcome case regarding one of the two questions posed by the High Court of
Justice (England & Wales) in the Thames Water ruling.86 Thames Water was facing criminal proceedings
because it had allegedly deposited untreated sewage water on land. There were discrepancies as to whether
the waste deposited actually constituted ‘controlled waste’ under the OldWaste Directive87 or waste within
the meaning of English legislation. The criminal proceedings brought by the Environment Agency would
stand if the waste was considered waste under the directive. In its preliminary ruling request the High Court
of Justice (England&Wales) asked the CJEUwhether ‘water waste’ constituted ‘waste’ within the meaning
of the directive. Moreover, the national court wanted to know whether the waste could be excluded from the
scope of the directive by virtue of an exception in the latter specifying that it would cover the waste insofar
there is no ‘other legislation’.
Following the questions as formulated by the High Court of Justice (England & Wales) almost to the
letter, as regards the first question the CJEU answered that ‘water waste’ did not alter the character of waste,
and thus as regards the second question, it is indeed within the scope of the directive. In line with the
interpretation by the CJEU, the High Court of Justice (England &Wales) accepted that the water waste was
indeed waste within the meaning of the directive.88 In doing so, a full account was provided of the Court of
Justice’s reasoning for its conclusions.
Full cooperation can also be observed in cases where the CJEU left more leeway to the national court
by means of a guidance case. In the already discussed Thames Water case, as regards the second question,
ie whether the waste could be excluded from the scope of the directive by virtue of an exception in the
latter providing that the directive covers waste insofar as there is no ‘other legislation’, the CJEU held that
for waste to be covered by ‘other legislation’, it had to contain ‘precise provisions organizing the
management of waste’ and ‘a level of protection equivalent to that under EU law’. Accordingly, it
instructed the national court to ascertain whether the national rules governing waste contended by
Thames Water met such criteria.
The High Court of Justice (England & Wales) then looked at the specific pieces of ‘other legislation’
mentioned by one of the parties to the proceedings, and decided in the negative.89 By so doing it fully took
into account the criteria laid down by the CJEU, and held that it was bound to decide only on those and no
others.90 The Court considered the regimes invoked by the defendant were unable to satisfy the CJEU’s test
in that they were merely ‘[ . . . ] dispersed regimes addressing harmful effects [ . . . ] and not precise pro-
visions governing the management of waste’.91
86. Case C-252/05 The Queen on the Application of: Thames Water Utilities Ltd v South East London Division, Bromley Magistrates’
Court ECLI: EU: C:2007:276; Thames Water Utility Ltd v Bromley Magistrates’ Court and The Environment Agency [2008]
EWHC 1763.
87. Council Directive 75/442/EEC of 15 July 1975 on waste [1975] OJ L 194/47. Today, Directive 2008/98/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste and repealing certain directives, [2008] OJ L 312/3.
88. See Thames Water, above n. 72.
89. Ibid. at 11.
90. Ibid. at 19–20.
91. Ibid. at 17.
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A similar conclusion can be reached regarding Edwards v Environment Agency;92 yet this conclusion
should be qualified. This case concerns the prohibitive nature of proceedings costs in environmental justice.
A decision approving the operation of a cement works was challenged by the applicant in court. The
applicant was refused legal aid and was ordered to provide a guarantee of £25,000 to take part in
the proceedings. The applicant relied on the EIA Directive and the IPPC Directive,93 which state that the
procedure must not be ‘prohibitively expensive’. Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court decided to
ask the CJEU, in essence, what ‘prohibitively expensive’ meant, and upon which criteria should this
determination be made.
The CJEU maintained that ‘prohibitively expensive’ referred to an amount capable of preventing a
person from pursuing a claim for review of a decision.94 This determination had to be done on the basis
of the financial status of the applicant, the environmental interest, whether the applicant had any prospect of
success, what the applicant’s interest was, the complexity of the law, the potential frivolous nature of the
claim, and the legal aid scheme.95 These criteria were to be applied to each stage of the proceedings.
The Supreme Court, obeying the CJEU’s interpretation, considered every single factor and applied them
to the facts at hand.96 Lord Carnwath applied the Court of Justice’s response in the part which referred to the
need to apply the criteria to determine whether the costs were prohibitive regardless of the stage of the
proceedings in which the costs are decided. The Supreme Court then sought guidance from the opinions of
the Advocate Generals on this point in other cases. The Supreme Court then went on to apply the criteria set
out by the Court of Justice. Even though the national court used only a part of the criteria laid down by the
CJEU to determine whether the costs were prohibitive, it did not refrain from considering all the criteria set
out before discounting the rest on grounded reasons. The Court found that the matter was not frivolous but
that the appellant did have any economic interest in the matter. Furthermore, it also held that the case was
not particularly complex. It ultimately made its decision, based on the two remaining factors, namely the
prospects of success and the importance of the case for the protection of the environment, finding that the
guarantee of £25,000 pounds was not unreasonably high.
It is debatable whether this outcome is positive or negative from the perspective of environmental
protection.97 From a substantive perspective, it can be argued that the Supreme Court should have con-
cluded that a guarantee of £25,000 pounds is too high. Yet it can also be argued that this decision represents
a step towards ensuring that people are not denied access to environmental matters solely based on costs, a
92. See Edwards v Environment Agency, above n. 67.
93. Council Directive 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the
environment [1985] OJ L 175/40. Today: Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December
2011 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment Text with EEA relevance [2011] OJ
L 26/3; Directive 2008/1/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 January 2008 concerning integrated pollution
prevention and control (Codified version) (Text with EEA relevance) OJ L 24/8. Today: Directive 2010/75/EU of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) Text
with EEA relevance OJ L 334/17.
94. Edwards v Environment Agency, above n. 67 at 35.
95. Ibid. at 41, 46–48.
96. R v Environment Agency and others [2013] UKSC 78, para 32.
97. On this debate, see J. Lopez, ‘Aarhus Costs Update’ (2016) 21(1) Judicial Review; D. Lock QC and A. Mills, ‘Protective Costs
Orders and Costs Capping Orders: The New Law’ (2016) 21(3) Judicial Review; B. Jaffey and R. Mehta, ‘Reigning in the
“Prohibitive Expense” of Environmental Litigation: Edwards v Environment Agency’ (2013) 18(4); and M.l Fordham, M.
Chamberlain, I. Steele and Z. Al-Rikabi, ‘Streamlining Judicial Review in a Manner Consistent with the Rule of Law’ (2014)
19(2) Judicial Review. See also G. Sarathy, ‘Costs in Environmental Litigation: Venn v Secretary of the State for Communities and
Local Government’ (2015) 27(2) Journal of Environmental Law 313–324; and G. de Baere, ‘The Right to “Not Prohibitively
Expensive” Judicial Proceedings under the Aarhus Convention and the ECJ as an International (Environmental) Law Court:
Edwards and Pallikaropoulos’ (2016) 53(6) Common Market Law Review 1727.
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sensitive issue in the UK.98 From a substantive perspective, it is therefore difficult to say whether this is a
case of compliance or not. What emerges from both the objective and subjective factors laid down by the
CJEU is the strong focus on the reasonableness and proportionality of costs, obliging a court to take the
particular circumstances of the applicant and the case into account when ruling on the whether the costs are
prohibitive.99 This means that the national rules of procedure must leave the national court a wide margin of
discretion to assess the proportionality of the costs.100 From a procedural perspective, the Supreme Court
used such room for manoeuvre and assessed the national rules in light of the CJEU’s guidance. Accordingly,
despite the reservations about the substantive aspects of the ruling, we consider this case an example of full
judicial cooperation.
3.2 Second category: Fragmented Cooperation
‘Fragmentation’ refers to the national court separating what it considers relevant to resolving the dispute in
question from the CJEU’s full response, from what it considers irrelevant. This category differs from
Bogojevic´’s gapped category in that in the latter, the national court would omit certain parts of the issue
when requesting a preliminary reference and the CJEU would rule only on the other parts. In the former, the
national court does not omit any part of the problem in its question, but instead chooses to only engage with
the parts of the preliminary reference response that it deems helpful for delivering its judgment, while
ignoring the reasoning of the rest. As elaborated below, this ‘engage and discard’ game played by the
national court resulted frommiscommunication between the CJEU –which did not explain the link between
the originally formulated question and the reformulated question answered – and the national court – which,
besides asking an awkward question, failed to attempt to link the CJEU’s ruling to the original question.
The Client Earth case concerns air quality management.101 The territory of the UK was divided into 43
zones for the purposes of assessing and managing air quality in accordance with Directive 2008/50/EC.102
One or more of the limit values established by the directive for nitrogen dioxide was exceeded in the course
of 2010 in 40 of those zones. A final compliance plan was submitted to the Commission under the directive,
which sought time extensions for 24 of the 40 zones. The UK did not make any such application for the
remaining 16 zones, and projected compliance with the limit values between 2015 and 2025 in its air quality
plans. ClientEarth brought a claim in the High Court, seeking an order requiring the Secretary of State for
the Environment to revise the plans to ensure that they would comply by January 2015 at the latest, which
was the maximum deadline extension under Article 22 of the Directive. That court dismissed the claim,
holding that even if a Member State had not complied with the limit values set out by the directive, it is not
required to apply under Article 22 for an extension of the deadline laid down by it. The court added that, in
any event, such an order would raise serious political and economic questions and involve political choices
which are not within the court’s jurisdiction. The claim reached the Supreme Court, which found it
necessary to request a preliminary ruling on several issues. First, it asked whether the Secretary of State
was obliged to make an application for the extension of the time limits for achieving compliance values.
98. See, e.g., Leigh, Day & Co Solicitors and WWF-UK ‘Using the Law: Barriers and Opportunities for Environmental Justice’
[2004] Capacity Global “Environmental Justice” Environmental Law Foundation; P. Stookes Civil Law Aspects of Environ-
mental Justice (London: Environmental Law Foundation, 2003); R. Macrory and M.WoodsModernising Environmental Justice
(London: UCL, 2003); I. Sullivan ‘Ensuring Access to Environmental Justice in England and Wales’ [2008] Working Group on
Access to Environmental Justice, chaired by the (then) Hon Mr Justice Sullivan.
99. See de Baere above n. 97 at 1734.
100. Ibid.
101. SeeClient Earth, n. 67.
102. Directive 2008/50/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 on ambient air quality and cleaner air for
Europe [2008] OJ L 152/1.
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Second, whether drawing up additional air quality plans, instead of an application for extension of the time
limits, could be considered as compliance with the directive. Finally, could a national court issue an order
obliging the national authorities to establish an air quality plan where they have not applied for a post-
ponement of a deadline.
The CJEU did not explicitly address whether the Secretary of State was obliged to trigger Article 22. This
is understandable given that it is clearly worded as a prerogative and not as a duty.103 This means that
Member States are not obliged to use this provision if they wish to comply with the deadlines under the
directive by 2010. However, as the CJEU clarified, if Member States wish to comply by 2015, hence
extending the deadlines, then Article 22 must be used. On whether preparing air quality plans instead of
seeking the extension of a deadline could be considered as compliance with the directive, the CJEU
responded in the negative. It maintained that extending the deadline and drawing up air quality plans belong
to two different scopes of application, and as such do not affect one another.104 Finally, the CJEU held that
where aMember State fails to meet its obligations under the directive and does not apply for an extension of
the time limits to meet these obligations, the national court is empowered to order the authorities to draw up
the required plans.105
When reformulating the Supreme Court’s first question, the CJEU missed the opportunity to avoid
ambiguity as to whether the Secretary of State breached Article 22 of the Directive by not applying for
an extension of the deadline before extending it. The question was reformulated from ‘Was he obliged to?’
to ‘Does a postponement of the deadline require an application under Article 22?’ The fact that the deadline
had been extended in any event was not considered. This led to both parties claiming success as to the
mandatory nature of the obligation under Article 22. It is hard to see how extending a deadline without
requesting an extension under Article 22, as occurred in the UK, can be considered as complying with the
directive. The CJEU’s judgment could have been used to conclude that Article 22 must be used to obtain an
extension, given that the UK had wanted to obtain one. Yet the Supreme Court considered that the CJEU’s
reasoning was insufficient to rule on whether the Secretary of State was under an obligation to make an
application under Article 22. Accordingly, the Supreme Court decided to refer to the position elaborated by
the European Commission in the proceedings, which argued that an extension to a deadline was not
mandatory. The Supreme Court was willing to apply the Commission’s reasoning and deem Article 22
non-mandatory, but given that the legal deadlines had already expired at that time, the court deemed this
issue irrelevant.106
It is not clear whether or not this route will lead to collision with the CJEU, since the CJEU was never
explicit on the obligation of the Secretary of State, but only on the obligation to apply for an extension to
avoid breaching the directive.107 There does, however, appear to be a tendency to go beyond the CJEU’s
ruling and use the Commission to fill in the gaps. This technique was also observed in Edwards, where the
Supreme Court used opinions of the Advocate Generals to fill in the perceived lacuna in the CJEU’s
reasoning.108
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court never considered whether the Secretary of State was under any obli-
gation because by the time the proceedings reached it in late 2015, the role of the Secretary of State had
become irrelevant, as the obligation to meet the directive’s standards had expired in 2010. Arguably, a link
103. Note the use of the modal verb ‘may’ in the text of the article.
104. Client Earth, above n. 67, at 46–49.
105. Ibid. at 56.
106. R (on the application of ClientEarth) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2015] UKSC 28, para. 27.
107. For an analysis of the case see J. Bell, ‘ClientEarth (No. 2): A Case of Three Legal Dimensions’ (2017) 29 Journal of Envi-
ronmental Law 343.
108. See section 3.1 above.
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could be drawn between this part of the ClientEarth case and the interrupted cooperation category observed
in Sweden in the Jan Nilsson case.109 However, in contrast to the Swedish Court, the UK judge did not
ignore the CJEU’s answer.110 Moreover, the rest of the CJEU’s judgment remained relevant and it was
followed by the Supreme Court. In line with the CJEU’s judgment, the Supreme Court considered the
breach of the directive, and issued an order for the Secretary of State to draft an air quality plan, even though
it deemed this act as a purely political decision outside of its jurisdiction.
3.3 Third category: Presumed Cooperation
The proper application of a preliminary ruling is regarded as the last step in a fully coordinated judicial
cooperation chain. However, as briefly introduced earlier in this article, it can happen that the party losing the
case before the CJEU withdraws from the national proceedings. In such cases the judicial cooperation chain
breaks, and the national decision ‘disappears’, making it impossible to gauge the national court’s degree of
compliance. This type of withdrawal must be distinguished fromwhen, for instance, parties agree a settlement
and the national court withdraws the reference request. In this case, the CJEU will not rule on the matter,
unless it has already given notice of a date on which its decision will be communicated.111 For the purposes of
this article only the former withdrawal will be considered. In both the cases discussed below, the advocate for
one of the parties informed us that the case had been withdrawn because the party which considered itself
having come off worst before the CJEU expected the national court to followed its judgment. This suggests
that the case was withdrawn because the party predicted full compliance on the part of the national judge. This
is why we consider these cases examples of presumed cooperation, rather than uncooperation.
This category does not cover cases which were withdrawn for any other reason than the one indicated
here, such as when parties reach an out-of-court settlement. In such other cases, no cooperation, actual or
presumed, occurs. Such cases therefore fall outside the scope of this study.
The first presumed cooperation case is Seaport v Department of Environment.112 This case concerns a
request made by Seaport to challenge the validity of the Department of Environment’s Area Plan 2016 in
Northern Ireland. The national court had previously found in another case that area plans should no longer
fall under the Department of Environment’s competence, based on its interpretation of Directive 2001/
42,113 which requires Member States to designate another authority to carry out this task. However, the
matter still needed some clarification and made it to the CJEU. The CJEU responded in the negative,
holding that as long as the ‘old’ authority was equipped to fulfil the tasks entrusted to it by the directive,
there was no need to establish a fresh national authority for the same task. Upon delivery of the judgment,
Seaport withdrew its claim, so it was never further determined by the national court.114
The second case isEtimine SA.115 This was a very technical and legally complex outcome case dealingwith
the classification and packaging of dangerous substances. On 19 December 2008, Etimine brought an action
against the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions before the High Court of Justice of England and Wales,
Queen’s Bench Division (Administrative Court) for judicial review of any measures taken by the United
109. See section 2.4 above.
110. In Jan Nilsson the criminal charges had been dropped due to the depenalisation of the crime he had allegedly committed.
111. Article 100(1) of the consolidated version of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of 25 September 2012; see also Case
210/06 CARTESIO Oktato´ e´s Szolga´ltato´ bt ECLI: EU: C:2008:723, para. 96.
112. See Seaport, above n. 70
113. European Parliament and Council Directive 2001/42/EC of 27 June 2001 on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and
programs on the environment [2001] OJ L197/30.
114. As confirmed by e-mail from the case counsel James Maurici, Landmark Chambers, 8 March 2017.
115. See Etimine, above n. 70.
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Kingdom Government to implement the classifications introduced by the Thirtieth ATP Directive116 and the
First ATPRegulation.117 Etimine contested the validity of the classifications of five entries inAnnex 1G to the
Thirtieth ATP Directive, which were reproduced in Annexes II and V to the First ATP Regulation, classifying
certain borate substances as toxic to reproduction. Etimine SA complained that the European Commission had
violated the principle of proportionality and several procedural requirements including the duty to provide
reasons, when classifying ‘borate’ substances as dangerous substances. The CJEU found no violation of the
principle of proportionality and deemed the Commission’s endeavours legally sound. The national claims here
were withdrawn because Etimine lost at the CJEU stage and decided not to continue.118
4 Synthesis and Comparison
It was noted previously in Bogojevic´’s contribution that the Swedish courts displayed a more diverse array
of judicial cooperation. They ranged from complete non-implementation of the CJEU’s ruling to the non-
referral of certain legal issues raised in the national proceedings, followed by ambiguous and legally
intricate responses from the CJEU. Conversely, something different emerged in the UK. UK judges tend
to follow the CJEU’s rulings as closely as possible.119 They give full account of the CJEU’s reasoning,
therefore refraining from engaging in silenced cooperation.
Arguably, a common characteristic of all the cases in the present study is that the CJEU’s instructions
were fairly simple to follow. For instance, in Edwards v Environment Agency, the court merely fleshed out
existing guidelines, just as it did in Thames Water. The CJEU set out a number of criteria to be taken into
account when determining the meaning of the concept of ‘prohibitively expensive’. The national court was
then only required to take those circumstances into account and reach a decision. As pointed out in section 2,
these ‘guidance’ cases are generally easy to follow.120 It was also noted above that ‘outcome’ cases are
simple to follow. For example, inDiane Barker v Bromley Council the CJEU’s answer was simple in that it
only had to prescribe that the UK had failed to implement the directive in question correctly by enacting a
national law precluding an EIA at a later stage. As such, the national court was only left with the task of
striking down the national authority’s decision not to grant the EIA.
In general, the cases forming the body of this study did not include examples of abstract and general
answers, which as introduced in section 2, offer a wider margin of manoeuvre for the national court, but
less certainty that the outcome at a national level will be as the CJEU prescribed. Only in ClientEarth
could the national court’s approach to the CJEU’s answer be said to deviate from the letter of the
European judges’ dictum. Yet this outcome is influenced by an instance of poor communication between
the national court and the CJEU. A closer look at this case reveals that, despite the miscommunication, the
Supreme Court was willing to apply the Commission’s reasoning to fill in the perceived gaps left by the
CJEU. Ultimately, the national court did not need to apply the Commission’s reasoning since the tem-
poral exception relied upon by the national authority had elapsed in the meantime. In turn, this led to
fragmentation of the cooperation, whereby the national court only applied the part of the CJEU’s ruling
applicable to the remaining part of the case.
116. Commission Directive 2008/58/EC of 21 August 2008 amending, for the purpose of its adaptation to technical progress, for the
thirtieth time, Directive 67/548, [2008] OJ 2008 L 246/1.
117. Regulation (EC) No. 1272/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on classification, labelling
and packaging of substances and mixtures, amending and repealing Directives 67/548 and 1999/45/EC, and amending Regu-
lation (EC) No. 1907/2006 [2008] OJ L 353/1.
118. As confirmed by e-mail from the case counsel Victoria Wakefield, Brick Court Chambers, 8 March 2017.
119. We remind here that Scottish courts have not made preliminary references in environmental matters.
120. Above n. 33.
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It thus appears that the manifest compliance in the UK circumvents any potential discussion about
liability claims under the Kobler doctrine for not properly implementing the preliminary ruling in question.
This contrasts with the findings for Sweden of Bogojevic´’s study, where the national courts did not always
demonstrate tendencies towards mutual understanding, and would deviate from the preliminary rulings
received. Evidently, as was also pointed out in the introduction to this article, judicial dialogue can consist
of elements of conflict and power (as in Sweden) but also mutual understanding (as in the UK). The findings
for the UK demonstrate that judicial dialogue there has displayed characteristics of mutual understanding
with little or no struggle for power. This mutual understanding and non-existent struggle also appears to
contradict Bobek’s assumption that national courts disregard both EU law and EU authority.
Based on these findings, the map of judicial dialogue in the EU as regards environmental matters can be
enriched as follows:
The marked difference in the outcomes of the empirical research in Sweden and the UK suggests the
national judicial culture has a strong impact on judicial dialogue. In particular, comparing the findings from
these two countries raises a question on the relationship between legislative practice as regards green-plating
and gold-plating and judicial sincere cooperation. It is indeed interesting to note that a country which is
Figure 1. Map of judicial dialogue in environmental matter in the EU (2 MS) – Derived from Council of the European
Union; Lovell Johns.121
121. Available at: https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/9c63193c-3f71-40c0-9aa7-d1fd18686046/lan
guage-en/format-PDF/source-40844365.
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considered at the forefront of environmental protection from a legislative perspective, demonstrates instances
of judicial uncooperation. In contrast, a countrywhich rarely goes any further than theminimum prescribed by
EU environmental standards performs remarkably well as regards judicial cooperation in environmental
matters. There is some strength to the argument that the more national environmental law remains close to
EU environmental law, the less room there is for national courts to deviate from CJEU’s rulings. Moreover, it
should not be forgotten that to qualify as green-plating and gold-plating, national law must comply with EU
law.122 Therefore, cases of interchanged cooperation, gapped cooperation, interrupted cooperation and
silenced cooperation deriving from a lawful discrepancy between national and EU environmental law should
never lead to under-implementation or a failure to implement EU environmental standards.
5 Conclusions
This study shows that UK courts tend to cooperate fully with the CJEU. Three new categories of judicial
cooperation have been highlighted in this regard: full cooperation, fragmented cooperation and presumed
cooperation. This finding confirms that mapping judicial dialogue is an ongoing process. Indeed, in this
study, none of Bogojevic´’s categories could be used to describe the UK. New categories could emerge if
other jurisdictions are analysed.
This study also suggests that national cultures influence judicial sincere cooperation in environmental
matters. More research is necessary to explore judicial dialogue fully, covering more national legal cultures
than covered so far. This would also permit us to advance from describing the kinds of judicial cooperation
evidenced to an analysis of the reasons behind the national courts’ behaviour.Wewould therefore argue for the
establishment of a comparative research programme to consider follow-up judgments in environmentalmatters.
It also appears that the majority of the CJEU’s judgments are not followed by a national judgment in the
UK, or that such judgments cannot be retrieved. Most cases where a preliminary question is posed simply
disappear from EU and national databases once the CJEU provides its response. There is an acute lack of
transparency about the reasons for such lacunae. We were only able to establish in a few cases that the
national party disadvantaged by the CJEU’s answer withdrew from the case, as it expected the national court
to comply with its ruling. Assuming that this was true of all other cases can be misleading. We also noticed
that, in one case, information about the national follow-up case was only available on Curia, but not at
national level. It is unclear how this can be possible.
There is a need for greater transparency in light of the importance of proper judicial cooperation and
judicial dialogue in assuring uniformity in the interpretation and application of EU law. The ongoing
judicial practice on preliminary reference follow-up lacks such transparency and invites improvement.
We urge for a closer application of the CJEU’s recommendation on this point. Further steps should also
be considered. For example, the adoption of a legal obligation in this regard, echoing similar ones in the
sphere of national implementation of EU directives, would help create what is not possible today, namely a
more systematic database of judicial dialogue and cooperation which is amenable to scrutiny and study.
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